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Summary 
When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating 
firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors 
may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering 
lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different 
strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, 
verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated 
procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with 
different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of 
performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive tendering. We 
prove that under complete information extremely severe handicapping is never a 
credible strategy for the buyer, rather the latter finds it optimal to punish the 
opportunistic firm so as to make the pool of competitors more alike. In other words, 
when opportunistic behaviour arises, the buyer should use handicapping to “level the 
playing field”. 
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When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering partic-
ipating ￿rms commit ex ante to ful￿ll a set of contractual duties. However, selected
contractors may ￿nd pro￿table to renege ex post on their promises by opportunis-
tically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard,
when delivered quality is veri￿able by a third part then a standard principal-agent
model applies and an explicit contract can be speci￿ed ex ante. However, there ex-
ist some goods or services whose quality is hard to verify, for example the services
essentially based on a high human capital component like IT and consulting, and
also research report, works of art, catering. When the contractor￿ s performance
consists essentially in the provision of human capital the buyer may ￿nd it hard,
if not impossible, to prove objectively whether the contractor has exactly complied
with the contractual duties. When quality is not veri￿able a formal contract cannot
be enforced by a third party, therefore it needs to be self-enforcing in order to be
e⁄ective.
Since procurement contracts are repeatedly awarded over time, reputation mech-
anisms may play a crucial role in providing dynamic incentives for contractors to
ful￿ll contractual clauses. A special form of reputation mechanism is to award a
certain score to a participating ￿rm based on its past performance. For instance, the
U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation prescribes that ￿[p]ast performance should be
an important element of every evaluation and contract award for commercial items.
Contracting o¢ cers should consider past performance data from a wide variety of
sources both inside and outside the Federal Government[...]. (FAR, 12.206)￿ .
In a contest of complete information and observable but non veri￿able quality
we allow the buyer to handicap a ￿rm that behaved opportunistically in the past.
We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards
a contract over time to two suppliers with di⁄erent e¢ ciency levels. If the ￿rm did
not provide satisfactory quality levels in a previously awarded contract the buyer
may reduce at her discretion the score assigned to the tender submitted by a ￿rm in
the future competitive tendering. We prove that extremely severe handicapping is
never a credible strategy for the buyer, rather the latter ￿nds it optimal to punish
the opportunistic ￿rm so as to make the pool of competitors more alike. In other
words, when opportunistic behavior arises, the buyer should use handicapping to
￿level the playing ￿eld￿ .
In particular, we set up an in￿nitely repeated game whose constituent (static)
game is composed of three stages. At the ￿rst stage a simpli￿ed version of the
sealed-bid competitive tendering takes place: the buyer requires ful￿llment of a
minimal quality standard and two fully informed heterogenous ￿rms bid only over
price. At the second stage, once awarded the contract, the contractor chooses
the quality. At the last stage the buyer observes the e⁄ective quality and decides
whether to handicap.
We allow the buyer and the contractor to use a single period punishment. When
no cheating on quality is observed no handicap is applied; otherwise the buyer
handicaps the opportunistic contractor only in the next competitive tendering. On
the other hand, the ￿rm does not cheat if no cheating and handicap has occurred
until that moment, otherwise it delivers zero quality only for one period.
This paper shows that the optimal strategy for the buyer is imposing in the next
competitive tendering a handicap equal to the e¢ cient ￿rm￿ s cost advantage, that
2also measures the e¢ cient ￿rm￿ s bidding advantage. In this scenario the bidders are
symmetric and get the same score in the competitive tendering. Given a tie break-
ing rule awarding the contract to the e¢ cient ￿rm, a su¢ ciently patient e¢ cient
contractor prefers not to shrink rather than win the next competitive tendering at
a lower price. An extremely harsh handicap (that is equivalent to exclusion from
the next competitive tendering) is not an optimal strategy for the buyer for two
reasons. First, it implicitly awards the contract to the less e¢ cient ￿rm that will
bid less aggressively and always deliver zero quality. Second, this reaction by the
less e¢ cient ￿rm induces the e¢ cient contractor not to deliver quality as well once
it will be rewarded the contract. Moreover, since the handicap is equivalent to an
increase in the e¢ cient ￿rm￿ s cost, we show that when the handicap is lower than
the ￿rm￿ s cost advantage the e¢ cient ￿rm￿ s equilibrium price is decreasing in the
handicap. In this scenario, the e¢ cient ￿rm still wins the competitive tendering by
gaining a positive pro￿t, therefore it has a lower incentive to deliver the required
quality. In particular, the lower the handicap with respect to the ￿rm￿ s cost ad-
vantage the less aggressive is the equilibrium bid and then lower is the procurer￿ s
utility.
Our paper shows that repeatedly awarded procurement contracts in which un-
veri￿able quality dimensions are relevant can be reinterpreted as relational con-
tracts between a buyer and a contractor that is threatened by a potentially less
e¢ cient competitor. Relational contracts pioneered by MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989) and re￿ned by MacLeod (2003), Levin (2003) consider non-veri￿able perfor-
mance dimensions. Since such contracts are not legally enforceable, they need to
be self-enforcing in order to be e⁄ective. These papers set up a in￿nitely repeated
interaction between a principal and an agent by assuming that the performance of
the latter is non-veri￿able. The main message is that a wage scheme composed of a
￿x and a discretionary payment depending on the performance usually characterizes
an optimal self-enforcing contract. All these papers employ a trigger strategy as in
Abreu (1988) in which the discretionary payment is used by the principal to punish
the cheating agent with the worst equilibrium outcome. We do not introduce a di-
rect punishment strategy as in MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), MacLeod (2003)
and Levin (2003). Our punishment is indirect in the sense that it does not consist
in a direct cost in the contractor￿ s utility, rather we allow the buyer to alter the
subsequent competitive tendering by reducing the score of the opportunistic con-
tractor. A further contribution of this paper is that our punishment lasts only one
period (￿stick and carrot￿ ). Such a strategy sounds more realistic in procurement
markets where, unless a serious wrongdoing like corruption o rebury is committed,
a buyer cannot resort to trigger strategies thus keeping any form of punishment
alive from one speci￿c moment onwards.
Our paper bears some ingredients from MacLeod (2003) that sets up a repeated
framework in which the performance evaluation depends on the correlation between
the principal￿ s and the agent￿ s beliefs. MacLeod, in fact, assumes that the agent￿ s
beliefs about his performance are correlated with the principal￿ s ones. Our paper
captures the case of perfect correlation.
To the best of our knowledge papers strictly related to past performance eval-
uation in repeated procurement are Kim (1998), Doni (2006) and Spagnolo and
Calzolari (2006). All of them introduce assume an extreme level of handicap since
the buyer is allowed to debar the opportunistic contractor from all subsequent
competitive tenderings. These papers model a repeated game in which the level of
handicapping is exogenous, whereas we characterize the credible level of handicap-
3ping characterizing a self-enforcing agreement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the static game, Section 3
￿nds the static equilibrium, and Section 4 introduces the analysis of the repeated
game. Section 5 concludes
2. THE MODEL
Consider a buyer who awards a procurement project to one of two ￿rms i = 1;2
by running a sealed-bid competitive tendering
The cost of each bidder is:
ci = ￿i +   (qi) (1)
The cost ￿ is ￿xed and it does not change according to the quality provided. It
represents the cost each ￿rm experiences in order to partecipate to the competitive
tendering. Each ￿rm incurs in the ￿xed cost ￿, even if it will not be awarded the
contract. We assumed ￿1 = ￿;￿2 = ￿ with ￿ > ￿, that is, ￿rm 1 is the most e¢ cient.
  (qi) is the variable cost of providing quality qi. We follow Kim (1998) and assume
that   (:) is common to both ￿rms.
The pro￿t of each ￿rm is:
￿i = pi ￿ ￿i ￿   (qi) (2)
where pi is the price paid to ￿rm i that delivers quality qi at cost ci. We also
assume that the buyer requires ful￿llment of a minimal quality standard denoted
by q. The quality q becomes the quality bided in the competitive tendering by
both the ￿rms. Once awarded the competitive tendering the ￿rm may shrink on
quality and depart from q, then the e⁄ective quality is de￿ned as qi = q ￿ m, with
m = f0;qg. The variable cost function respects the following conditions:  
0 (:) ￿ 0,
 
00 (:) ￿ 0,  
0 (0) = 0,   (0) = 0, in particular there exists some points along   (:)
with slope lower than one2. Also, we assume ￿ ￿ ￿ >   (q): ￿rm 1 is much more
e¢ cient than ￿rm 2. This assumption will be fundamental for the result of the
paper, nevertheless it is also quite reasonable.
The utility function of the buyer is as follows:
U = qi ￿ pi (3)
We also assume that i) the buyer perfectly observes the quality and the costs of
the ￿rms, ii) the ￿rms are fully informed. Assumption i) is in line with the common
idea that a procurer is more informed on the cost of the ￿rm than a standard
regulator because the former is usually composed of managers coming from the
private sector3. Although the buyer knows the costs of the ￿rms she needs to run
an competitive tendering to award the project. This apparently counterintuitive
assumption actually ￿ts many competitive tendering where the buyer knows ex-
ante the e¢ ciency of the bidders. This is the case of those procurement acquisitions
repeated over time in which bidders are in general always the same and the buyer
runs the competitive tendering only because mandatory by the law.
Let us introduce the three-stage static game G whose timing is the following:
2The last assumption is purely technical, however its necessity will be clear in the proof of
Lemma 1.
3As explained in Kim (1998).
4First stage A reduced version of the sealed-bid competitive tendering in Burget
and Che (2004) takes place. The Buyer requires ful￿llment of a minimal qual-
ity standard denoted by q. When ￿rms accept to take part to the competitive
tendering they automatically commit to bid quality q therefore competitive
bidding is only over price. Firms submit their bids simultaneously and non-
cooperatively. The highest score (or the lowest price) awards the competitive
tendering. In the case of the same score the buyer uses a tie-breaking rule
awarding the contract to the most e¢ cient ￿rm (￿rm 1).4
Second stage The contractor decides the e⁄ective level of quality and may depart
from the required level.
Third stage The buyer decides whether to handicap by an amount h the scoring
rule of the opportunistic contractor in the next competitive tendering.
We anticipate that G will be the constituent game for the in￿nitely repeated
game introduced in the Section 4.
3. THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE STATIC GAME
We solve by backward induction. At the third stage the buyer simply decides
the level of handicap h > 0. Since handicapping will be e⁄ective from the next
period, in the this section we can only focus on the second and the ￿rst stage. We
employ the technical assumption that when handicapping is applied it is assumed
2  (q) ￿ h. This assumption will mainly determine the result of the paper, however
it does not a⁄ect the quality of our results5.
3.1. Second stage: optimal e⁄ective quality
Once the competitive tendering has been awarded the contractor faces the fol-
lowing maximization problem:
max
m pi ￿ ￿i ￿   (q ￿ m) (4)
solving w.r.t. m the solution is:
 
0 (q ￿ m) = 0 (5)
this means that m￿ = q. In the static game the contractor has an incentive not
to deliver quality at all. The optimal quality will be q￿
i = 0. Since the static game
ends at the third stage each contractor will behave opportunistically regardless the
handicap.
3.2. First stage: competitive tendering
Given the ￿xed level of quality required by the contract, when ￿rm i is not
handicapped it bids under the follwing scoring rule:
4This tie-breaking rule is similar to that used in Kim (1998). He assumes that when biders
quote the same price the ￿ip of coin determines the winner.
5As will be clarify in the Section 4, this assumption is a necessary condition for the existence
of a "cooperative" equilibrium in the dynamic game.
5Si = q ￿ pi (6)
On the other hand, when it is handicapped its scoring rule is:
Si = q ￿ pi ￿ h (7)
Following Burguet and Cheb (2004) we de￿ne the bidding advantage of ￿rm i
over ￿rm 2 as:
￿ = q1 ￿ ￿ ￿   (q1) ￿
￿
q2 ￿ ￿ ￿   (q2)
￿
(8)
Since we are assuming the ful￿llment of a minimal quality standard q and iden-
tical variable cost, then the bidding advantage of ￿rm 1 when it is handicapped
becomes:
￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ h (9)
On the other hand, since we allows either ￿rm to be handicapped, the bidding
advantage of ￿rm 1 when ￿rm 2 is handicapped is:
e ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ + h (10)
However, since we are solving by backward induction, in the ￿rst stage ￿rms
anticipate that the optimal (e⁄ective) quality delivered in the next stage will be 0,
therefore we have   (0) = 0.
We de￿ne the equilibrium bids as follows:
Proposition 1. Given ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ h, the equilibrium bids of G are:
p￿
1 = ￿ +   (0) + maxf￿;0g = ￿ + maxf￿;0g (11)
p￿
2 = ￿ +   (0) + maxf￿￿;0g = ￿ + maxf￿￿;0g (12)
the pro￿ts of the biders are ￿1 = maxf￿;0g and ￿2 = maxf￿￿;0g
Proof. See B&C (2004). The di⁄erence is that our bidding advantage collapses
to ￿ = ￿￿￿￿h because we assume a ￿xed q instead of a continuos quality . Also,
di⁄erently from B&C, in our model quality and price are chosen sequentially and
not simultaneous, therefore by backward induction we have q = 0 in the equilibrium
price.
Proposition 1 says that, when the handicap is lower than the bidding advantage
of ￿rm 1, the competitive tendering is still awarded to the e¢ cient ￿rm that bids
a price equal to the ￿xed cost of ￿rm 2 minus the handicap. In other words, when
the score of the e¢ cient ￿rm is reduced by an exogenous amount, then ￿rm 1 needs
to reduce its price by the same amount (bid more aggresively) in order to recover
the score lost and keep winning the tendering.
To ￿nd the equilibrium bids in the static contest we simply consider no handicap
(h = 0). In this case ￿rm 1 wins the competitive tendering and the equilibrium
bids at the ￿rst stage are:
p1 = ￿ (13)
p2 = ￿ (14)
6In this equilibrium the e¢ cient ￿rm is able to outbid the rival gaining a pro￿t
equal to its cost advantage.
On the other hand when ￿rm 2 is handicapped the equilibrium bids are as
follows:
Proposition 2. Given e ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ + h, the equilibrium bids of G are:
p￿
1 = ￿ +   (0) + e ￿ = ￿ + h (15)
p￿
2 = ￿ +   (0) = ￿ (16)
the pro￿ts of the biders are ￿1 = e ￿ and ￿2 = 0
Proof. See the proof of the Proposition 1.
In this case the bidding advantage of ￿rm 1 is higher than in the previous case.
The intuition is the same as in the proposition 1: handicapping the less e¢ cient
￿rm is equivalent to increase the score of the e¢ cient one by an exogenous amount,
then in equilibrium ￿rm 1 increases its bid (with respect to the case of no handicap)
by an amount equal to the handicap of the rival by still winning the competitive
tendering and increasing its pro￿t.
4. THE DYNAMIC GAME
In this section we introduce the dynamic game as an in￿nitely repetition of the
static game G. Since t = 1 on, the equilibrium of G depends on the h, then in what
follows we anticipate three possible equilibria of G according to h.
4.1. The role of handicapping
We recall that the bidding advantage of ￿rm 1 over ￿rm 2, when both bid the




measures the asymmetry among the competitors and it denotes the upper bound
level of handicap that make the e¢ cient ￿rm be awarded the contract. The level
of h can be also seen as a increase in the ￿xed cost of ￿rm 1. When h = ￿ ￿ ￿, the
increase in the ￿xed cost of ￿rm 1 makes both ￿rms alike and the bidding advantage
is exactly compensated. A level h < ￿￿￿ makes ￿rm 1 still more e¢ cient, whereas
h > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ts the scenario in which ￿rm 1 has a higher ￿xed cost than ￿rm 2. Let
us consider the following cases A, B and C.
A) 2  (q) ￿ h < ￿ ￿ ￿ :￿rm 1 wins the competitive tendering and the equilibrium
is:
pA
1 = ￿ ￿ h (17)
pA
2 = ￿ (18)
￿A
1 = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ h (19)
￿A
2 = 0 (20)
In this scenario the handicap is not harsh enough to switch contractors. In
particular, when ￿rm 1 is handicapped by h, then the bid pA
1 = ￿ makes the
e¢ cient ￿rm outbided by ￿rm 2.
7B) h = ￿ ￿ ￿ :nobody wins the competitive tendering, however the most e¢ cient
￿rm (￿rm 1) is awarding the contract by the tie-breaking rule. The equilibrium
is:
pB
1 = ￿ (21)
pB
2 = ￿ (22)
￿B
1 = 0 (23)
￿B
2 = 0 (24)
Note that in this scenario the handicap makes the bidders symmetric.
C) h > ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿rm 2 wins the competitive tendering and the equilibrium is:
pC
1 = ￿ (25)
pC
2 = ￿ + h (26)
￿C
1 = 0 (27)
￿C
2 = h ￿ ￿ + ￿ (28)
This higher level of handicap induces to switch contractor. The e¢ cient ￿rm is
no longer able to outbid the less e¢ cient one that wins the competitive tendering
by bidding less aggressively than in A) and B). In the next section we will use
scenario C as benchmark to study the trade-o⁄ from handicapping: although a
su¢ ciently high handicap may give incentive not to shrink, it may implicitly awards
the contract to the less e¢ cient ￿rm that wins the next competitive tendering by
bidding less aggressively.
The following Corollary de￿nes the equilibrium bids of the stage game when the
contractor decides to deliver the quality q and no handicapping is applied.
Corollary 1. In the stage game, when no handicap is applied, ￿rm 1 will
win the competitive tendering even though it will deliver q at the last stage. The
equilibrium bids are p￿
1 = p￿
2 = ￿
Proof. Proposition 1 shows that ￿rm 1 always wins the competitive tendering
when both ￿rms at the ￿rst stage make their bids anticipating that they will not
deliver quality at the second stage. Hence, to prove Corollary 1 it remains to show
that ￿rm 2 will never win the competitive tendering even when ￿rm 1 delivers
q. The proof comes from the assumption ￿ ￿ ￿ >   (q). Consider that the most
aggressive bid by ￿rm 2 is p2 = ￿, that is the price bided when ￿rm 2 anticipates
that it will not deliver quality in the stage game. When ￿rm 1 wants to deliver
quality q, by assumption ￿ ￿ ￿ >   (q) we have that it may win the competitive
tendering and gain a positive pro￿t with all the bids from ￿ +   (q) to ￿. Thus,
given the equilibrium bids of the stage game in (11)-(12), it is possible to see that
the only equilibrium when ￿rm 1 decides to deliver q is p1;2 = ￿.
84.2. The repeated game
Let G1 be the supergame obtained by an in￿nite repetition of the game G. We
assume that ￿ and ￿ are ￿xed over time. Let ￿ be the discount factor common to the
￿rms and the buyer. Let Ht be the common knowledge vector of previous actions
undertaken by the players in period up to t￿1. Also, let H0 be the history at time
0. Consider now the following speci￿cations of the history given in the following
de￿nitions.
Definition 1. Let b Ht be the history at time t such that up to the second stage
of time t the contractor produces q and no handicap has occurred.
Definition 2. Let e Ht be the history at time t such that up to time t ￿ 1 the
contractor produces q and no handicap has occurred.
Given the history in De￿nitions 1-2, in the De￿nition 3-5 we anticipate the "stick
and carrot" strategies pioneered in Abreu (1986) that will characterize a SNE of
G1.
Definition 3. Let sb
t be the strategy of the buyer at time t such that:
￿ if Ht = H0, no handicap is applied.
￿ if Ht = b Ht, no handicap is applied.
￿ otherwise she decides to handicap (h) the cheating contractor for one period,
after which revert to no handicap.
Definition 4. Let s1
t be the strategy of ￿rm 1 at time t such that:
￿ if Ht = H0, it deliver q
￿ if Ht = e Ht, once the competitive tendering has run, it delivers q
￿ If the buyer deviates from its strategy and ￿rm 1 is handicapped even thought
it delivers q, then it decides to deliver q￿ for one period, after which revert to
q.
Definition 5. Let s2
t be the strategy of ￿rm 2 at time t such that in every
period (included t = 0) it delivers q￿:
The presence of the less e¢ cient ￿rm serves as threat for the most e¢ cient one
who in general would win the competitive tendering and deliver the service.




(￿rm 1 wins and does not shrink and the buyer does not handicap) is:
￿1 = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   (q) (29)
That is, ￿rm 1 wins the competitive tendering by bidding p1 = ￿ and providing
q: By Corollary 1 we know that ￿rm 1 still gains positive pro￿t even bidding a price
equal to the ￿xed cost of ￿rm 2 and providing quality q as well.





9When ￿rm 1 does not cheat and no handicap is imposed, the discounted pro￿t








When ￿rm 1 respects the quantity q, the buyer gains exactly q and rewards the
contractor with a payment equal to bided price (￿)
The following de￿nition helps to characterize the SNE of G1.
Definition 6. Let e ￿ be the critical level of the discount factor such that the
discounted payo⁄ of each player at t when Ht = b Ht is equal to the payo⁄ when
Ht 6= b Ht




pends on ￿ and more interesting on h. Thus let us consider the following cases:
A)2  (q) < h ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. Let hA be a level of handicap at most equal to ￿ ￿ ￿. In
this scenario ￿rm 1 still wins the competitive tendering and the static equilibrium
bids and pro￿ts are6:
pA
1 = ￿ ￿ hA (32)
pA
2 = ￿ (33)
￿A
1 = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ hA (34)
￿A
2 = 0 (35)




to characterize a SNE is that the strategy punishment is credible, that is once the




t. Now in the following Lemma we can introduce a necessary condition
for the SNE to exist.




to characterize a SNE of G1 are
 (q)
hA￿ (q) ￿ e ￿A ￿ ￿ and q ￿ h.
Proof. We consider the repeated game starting at t = 0 and sketch the proof
over two points. We consider only the strategy of ￿rm 1 and the buyer because,
given hA, ￿rm 2 always bids pA
2 and never wins the competitive tendering. 1)
Firstly, consider ￿rm 1. When ￿rm 1 cheats its discounted pro￿t is:
V A







Where ￿1 is the pro￿t gained by ￿rm 1 at time t = 0 if it decides to cheat and
produce q￿ = 0. At t = 1, according to sb
t the handicap is applied for one period,
however ￿rm 1 still wins the competitive tendering but a more aggressive price,
6We recall that when hA = ￿ ￿￿ supplier 1 wins the competitive tendering by the tie-breaking
rule




￿t￿1 = ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿A
1 + ￿2
1￿￿￿1
10then it gains ￿A
1 . Since t = 2 on, no handicap is applied and ￿rm 1 reverts to q for
ever by gaining ￿1. Hence, the condition for ￿rm 1 not to cheat on quality is:




(hA ￿   (q))
￿ e ￿A ￿ ￿ (38)
To characterize the SNE we also need to show that the punishment strategy of ￿rm
1 is credible. This means that ￿rm 1 should not deviate from his strategy once
the punishment phase gets started. The punishment de￿ned in s1
t (that is, ￿rm 1
delivers q￿ = 0 only for one period and then reverts to q) is credible when, once
the punishment is e⁄ective, then ￿rm 1 has not incentive to deviate from q￿ = 0
during the period of the punishment phase. Nevertheless, since q￿ = 0 is its best
reply in the static three stage game, then during the punishment ￿rm 1 does not
deviate from q￿ = 0. Hence, s1
t is credible. Then the necessary condition for s1
t to
characterize a SNE is e ￿A ￿ ￿. It is possible to see that without the assumption
2  (q) < hA we have e ￿A > 1 implying that strategy s1
t cannot characterize a SNE
and ￿rm 1 would never deliver q8. 2) Second, consider the buyer. When the
punishment as de￿ned in sb
t and s1
tstarts the e⁄ective quality is zero for one period

















If at time t = 0 the buyer deviates and decide to handicap ￿rm 1 even if it has




. At time t = 1, under
hA, ￿rm 1 wins the competitive tendering at price pA
1 = ￿ ￿ hA and, according to
s1
t, it delivers zero quality. Since t = 2 on, the buyer and the e¢ cient ￿rm revert
to their strategy, that is ￿rm 1 reverts to q and wins all the competitive tenderings





period. Thus the necessary condition for the buyer not to cheat is:
U > UA (40)
that holds for every ￿ 2 [0;1] when q ￿ hA: Hence, the buyer always respects her
strategy only for su¢ ciently small level of handicapping9.
Although handicapping is such that the most e¢ cient ￿rm keeps winning the
competitive tendering, cheating is not a so optimum strategy as it seems. There
are two e⁄ects working at this level: cheating on q will directly increase the utility
8Since we will show that under a handicap h > ￿ ￿ ￿ the strategy s1
t will not characterize a
SNE as well, then without the assumption 2  (q) < hA our model collapses.
9Since we assume hA ￿ 2  (q) and ￿ ￿ ￿ >   (q), the necessary condition for q > hA to holds
is q > 2  (q):However, whether the condition q ￿ hA holds or not depends on the slope of the
variable cost. In particular, since   (q) is convex, the choice of a level q such that q > 2  (q)
depends on the slope and the degree of convexity of   (:). However, it is straightforward to show
that whenever the slope of   (:) is lower than one then there always exists a level of qsuch that
q > hA holds. On the other hand, it is also straightforward to show that when the slope of   (:)
is always higher than one, then we always have q < 2  (q) then q < hA.
Furthermore, if we assume a linear variable cost  q with slope   < 1
2, then the necessary
condition for q > hA to hold is always respected.
11of the contractor, nevertheless this handicap will induce the e¢ cient ￿rm to charge
a lower price in order to win the next competitive tenderings. When the variable
cost of producing q is su¢ ciently low then the gain from cheating on q is also low
therefore ￿rm 1 prefers not to cheat at t = 0 and gain the "cooperative" pro￿t
over time rather than cheat and winning the next competitive tenderings at a lower
price.
B) h > ￿ ￿ ￿: Let hB be a level of handicap strictly higher than ￿ ￿ ￿. In this
scenario ￿rm 2 wins the competitive tendering and the static equilibrium bids and
pro￿ts are:
pB
1 = ￿ (41)
pB
2 = ￿ + hB (42)
￿B
1 = 0 (43)
￿B
2 = hB ￿ ￿ + ￿ (44)
Lemma 2. When h > ￿ ￿ ￿, the e¢ cient ￿rm never respects s1
t and ￿nds it
optimal to deliver q￿, then s1
t, sb
t and s2
t cannot characterize a SNE of G1.
Proof. We show that the strategy of ￿rm 1; s1
t; can not characterize a SNE.
Since the respect of the strategy s1




t to characterize a SNE of G1, we can avoid the analysis of strategy sb
t. Again
consider the repeated game starting at t = 0. Since under hB ￿rm 2 wins the next
competitive tendering we now need to consider also the quality choice of ￿rm 2. The
rest of the proof proceeds over two steps. 1) Firstly, we show that in every period
of the repeated game ￿rm 2 always delivers q￿(that is, it never delivers a positive
quality). Assume that ￿rm 2 delivers q; in this case it gains ￿2 = hB ￿￿+￿￿  (q);
however, according to the strategy sb
t, no handicap will be applied in the next
period, then ￿rm 2 will lose the next competitive tendering. On the other hand, if
￿rm 2 delivers q = 0 it gains ￿B
2 as in (44); in this case ￿rm 2 will be handicapped
and will lose the next competitive tendering as well. Hence, given ￿2 < ￿B
2 , ￿rm
2 always cheats on quality under hB. 2) Secondly, consider ￿rm 1. Now we shows
that ￿rm 1 always prefers to cheat on quality (deliver q￿ = 0) instead of delivering
q. Given the result in point 1, by Proposition 2 the bidding advantage of ￿rm 1
becomes e ￿ = ￿￿￿+hB. Thus, the equilibrium bid in (15)-(16) implies that ￿rm 1
wins the competitive tendering by bidding p￿
1 = ￿ + hB. Let e ￿1;q denote the pro￿t
￿rm 1 gains by bidding p￿
1 = ￿ + hB and providing q, then:
e ￿1;q = hB + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   (q) (45)
Deviation entails that ￿rm 1 produces q￿(q = 0) for one period and then revert to
q. When ￿rm 1 deviates its discounted pro￿t is:
V B






If ￿rm 1 deviates at t = 0 its current pro￿t is ￿1. At t = 1 it will be handicapped
and the competitive tendering will be won by ￿rm 2, then ￿rm 1 gains zero. By
point 1, we know that ￿rm 2 always delivers q￿ = 0, then it will be handicapped
12as well at time t = 110, therefore, at time t = 2, ￿rm 1 wins again the competitive
tenderings but at price p￿
1 = ￿ + hB. However, since t = 2 on ￿rm 1 reverts to q,
then it gains ￿1 from t = 3 on. The condition for ￿rm 1 to always deliver q is:
V 1 > V B
1 (47)
that never holds for every ￿ 2 [0;1] 1112.
Lemma 2 says that when the handicap is higher than the bidding advantage of
￿rm 1, the e¢ cient ￿rm never respects its strategy s1
t. The reason is that ￿rm 2
￿nds it optimal not to deliver quality in every period. In particular, ￿rm 1 ￿nds
it more pro￿table providing zero quality, losing the tendering for one period and
being reawarded the contract when ￿rm 2 is handicapped rather than delivering q
for ever.
Once shown that a too harsh handicap does not induce the most e¢ cient ￿rm
to deliver q, we know that under hB the strategies in de￿nition 1-3 will never
characterize a SNE. Thus the only handicap we can consider is hA. However, to
show that the handicap hA is SNE we need to check for the credibility of sb
t. We
do that in proof of the following Proposition:




SNE of G1 in which in every period the e¢ cient ￿rm is awarded the contract and
it delivers q.
Proof. Given the results in Lemma 1-2, the last step to characterize the SNE
is ￿nding whether the level hA makes the strategy punishment in sb
t credible for
the buyer. The punishment is credible when, given the choice of the contractor,
the action played by the buyer really represents her best reply. Now considering
that the buyer can react to the opportunistic ￿rm by using h = f0;hA;hBg, then
￿nding the credible punishment is equivalent to ￿nd which level of h allows the




t cannot characterize a SNE under hB, in order to ￿nd the most
credible handicap we focus only on hA
13 . Under hA, once the punishment gets
started the buyer gains UA =
￿







; this is maximized at the
highest value of hA that is hA = ￿ ￿ ￿14, then hA = ￿ ￿ ￿ represents the credible
strategy.
10We recall that handicapping at time t = 1 entails that the reduction in the score will be
applied on the scoring rule at time t = 2
11By rewriting inequality V 1 > V B
1 we have 1




that simpli￿ed becomes ￿2h ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
￿

















12The threat of ￿rm 1 is credible because, according to the strategy s1
t, in the period of pun-
ishment ￿rm 1 delivers q￿ = 0 (that is its short-run best reaction).
13We recall that 2  (q) < hA ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿












13Proposition 3 highlights the trade o⁄ from handicapping and con￿rms the in-
tuition according to which a strong handicap as deterrence for moral hazard on
quality does not e⁄ectively bene￿t the buyer when the contract is awarded by a
competitive tendering. In particular, proposition 3 says that the best strategy for
the buyer is to punish the cheating e¢ cient ￿rm by choosing a level of handicap
that makes the heterogeneous competitors more symmetric. A too harsh handi-
cap makes the buyer worse o⁄ because of two e⁄ects. First, when the handicap is
higher than the bidding advantage of the e¢ cient ￿rm, the less e¢ cient supplier
wins the next competitive tendering by bidding less aggressively and providing zero
quality; second, this behavior induces the e¢ cient ￿rm to behave opportunistically:
it prefers losing the tendering for one period but be reawarded the contract at less
aggresive condition when ￿rm 2 is handicapped.
Proposition 3 also shows that the optimal handicapping strategy does not only
depend on the performance but also on the degree of asymmetry among the com-
petitors. Consider h = ￿￿￿. It is straightforward to see that the willingness of the





15. When the competitors are very asymmetric
the buyer needs a harsh handicap to make more e⁄ective the threat of switching
contractor and induce the e¢ cient ￿rm to deliver q. In fact, in the extreme case of
perfect symmetry (￿ ￿ ￿ = 0) the e¢ cient ￿rm will never deliver q in every period.
In particular, when the ￿rms are identical the buyer does not need the threat of
switching contractor in order to induce the ￿rm to deliver q. Nevertheless, when
no handicap is applied the contractor has incentive to behave opportunistically16.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a solution to deter ex post moral hazard in repeated pro-
curement when the quality delivered by the contractor is not veri￿able by a third
part. We have considered a framework in which a long-run relationship between a
buyer and an e¢ cient seller is built on a series of short-run contracts. In princi-
ple, the presence of a less e¢ cient supplier puts an upper bound to the incumbent
seller￿ s pro￿t per-period pro￿t. However, the e¢ cient seller may be tempted to
increase its pro￿t by not delivering the agreed level of (unveri￿able) quality.
We have then explored how the buyer would optimally use a discipline device
that consists in altering at her discretion the incumbent seller￿ s score in subsequent
competitive tendering (handicapping). In other words, what would happen if the
buyer could resort to an indirect punishment device that goes through the mod-
i￿cation of the ￿playing ￿eld￿between the two competitors? Our answer is that
extreme forms of punishment are never credible, that is, it is never in the buyer￿ s
interest to kick the deviant incumbent out of the playing ￿eld. The buyer￿ s optimal
strategy is, rather, to perfectly level the playing ￿eld for once if the incumbent had
deviated from the cooperative strategy (i.e., deliver the agreed level of quality).
There are at least two directions for further investigation. First, we have implic-
itly assumed that both the buyer and the incumbent contractor observe a perfectly
15We recall that, under hA = ￿￿￿, the condition for the e¢ cient ￿rm to deliver q is
 (q)
hA￿ (q) ￿ ￿.











16However, by the assumption ￿ > ￿ +   (q), we rule out the case of perfect symmetry between
￿rms because when ￿ ￿ ￿ = 0 the pro￿t gained by the contractor would be ￿1 < 0.
14correlated signal about delivered quality. It would be worth testing the robustness
of our predictions when the two signals are imperfectly correlated as in McLeod
(2003). Secondly, the assumption of complete information about ￿rms￿e¢ ciency
levels is instrumental to buyer for ￿ne-tuning the optimal handicapping strategy.
When the buyer is uncertain about ￿rms￿costs the former has to rely on equilib-
rium bids to learn about ￿rms￿e¢ ciency levels. The interaction between learning
and handicapping certainly deserves a closer attention.
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